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The
MARKET
Mystique
It's easy enough to point out the shortcomings o f our 
current economic orthodoxy. It's a much harder task 
pointing the way out o f the morass. ALR assembled a 
roundtable discussion to ponder the issues.
s ue McCreadie is economic research officer for the Textile, Clothing and Footwear unions. Ivo Favotto is an economist for the NSW Chamber of 
Manufactures. Peter Kriesler and Greg Mahony 
teach in economics at the University of NSW. The 
discussion was chaired by David Burchell.
Over the last few months there has been a discernible 
shift in the tide of public debate. Criticism of economic 
rationalism has become much more fashionable, when 
for most of the 80s it was ruled out of court as being 
manifestly silly. You've got the Victorian opposition, 
you've even got Malcolm Fraser polemicising against it. 
So from a whole lot of different sectors, including busi­
ness and manufacturing, economic rationalism is more 
under siege than it's been for years. And obvious 
evidence of this is the way that Michael Pusey's book 
Economic Rationalism in Canberra has been received- 
much more respectfully than it might have been until 
quite recently, one would have thought. One starting-off 
point for this discussion, then, is perhaps to step back 
from the critique of economic rationalism that Pusey's 
popularised, which is not really a new one and has been 
lurking around the backblocks of Australian politics for 
most of the last decade, and look at what it is that we 
mean when we talk about economic rationalism.
Peter: The way I would define it is that markets are the 
most efficient way of achieving various ends, that reduting 
government intervention in markets is always going to 
lead, in the long run, to people being better off.
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The cold wind o f  market forces.
Sue: I think one of the problems in looking at it at the level 
of popular discussion is that it's become what monetarism 
used to be, which is a kind of catch-all term of abuse. Under 
the heading of economic rationalism one will tend to find 
the obvious things such as privatisation, financial 
deregulation, reduced protection, micro-economic reform. 
You'll find labourmarketderegulation and user-pays. Fun­
nily enough in some definitions you'll find wage restraint 
under the Accord—which seems a bit odd to me. It may 
not be something to celebrate, but nor is it economic 
rationalism, it's incomes policy. The problem with that is, 
that having defined it as simply a rag-bag of policies, do 
those policies constitute a coherent whole?
Ivo: One thing related to why it's popular is the name 
'rationalism'. If you're not an economic rationalist, what 
are you, an irrationalist?
Peter: I think it's very important that there is no economic 
justification whatever for this view of markets. There's no 
body of theory that tells us that unfettered markets allocate 
better than the government sector, that unfettered markets 
are better at doing any particular job than markets with 
government intervention.The important thing to note is
that economic rationalism does not have a body of theory 
behind it. It's a pure ideology, divorced from theory, and 
any good economist will tell you, no, we can't justify what 
we're doing on the grounds of theory.
Greg: You can say at one level of economic debate that 
that's been true, certainly since the 1870s, and perhaps 
since Adam Smith. Bu t that still doesn't d eter the grea t bulk 
of conventional economists from being persuaded to free- 
market conceptions as a political view.
If you look around the world, the commonsense view that 
the intelligent person on the street would get, would be, 
if you look at the experience of the world economy in the 
last 10 or 20 years, that market economies are more suc­
cessful than economies which have particularly high 
levels of government intervention.
Peter: But thi s belief is based on a misperception. If we have 
a look at the great success stories, the developing Asian 
economies, and Japan in particular, they are countries in 
which there has been very active go vemment intervention.
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Greg: I see Japan a sa b ito fa  different story. I see it as being 
a shining example of how to blend extreme market forces, 
excessive competition, with high levels of government in­
tervention in the economy. It's a mixture of both, not neces­
sarily an example of one or the other.
Sue; Generally, the critique of economic rationalism would 
criticise the reduction in protection, which seems to assume 
that we're not in favour of it. It also tends to add micro- 
economic reform to the litany of sins that are going on. Is 
the assumption therefore—and it is for many people on the 
Left—that those are incorrect policies? I would think that 
it's a rather complex issue. How far should you be reducing 
protection? I don't have an article of faith that we should 
retain it at its current levels, or that the old-style protec­
tionism worked, but some of the critiques of economic 
rationalism seem to me to simply leave us with what we 
had in the past, without an understanding of why that past 
approach didn't work.
Why hasn’t the Left been 
able to put up a coherent 
alternative understanding 
of this thing called 
the market?
So when you have some sort of coherent platform put up, 
say from the Australian Manufacturing Council, or from 
the ACTU, that platform tends to say: well, we agree with 
some of the attempts at removing impediments to the 
market, such as reducing protection and micro-economic 
reform. At the same time, as you mentioned before, we 
don't have an approach called market fetishism, where we 
think that simply removing those impediments will make 
things work. But rather, we say: remove some of those 
impediments and introduce other industry policies, some 
of which, we would have to admit, are also about making 
markets work better. A lot of the policy ini tiatives that ha ve 
been proposed from the labour movement aren't about 
setting up alternatives to the market, but recognising 
market failure.
Greg: I think that's an interesting issue for the Left. Why 
hasn't the Left, in the current debate as in the past, been 
able to put up a coherent policy, or a coherent alternative 
understanding of this thing called the market? There are a 
whole series of ad hoc proposals and different proposi­
tions, with varying degrees of coherence, and it seems to 
me that this goes back a lot longer than 10 years, this lack 
of capacity to put forward a coherent perspective.
Sue: But is what we want an alternative blueprint—or, as 
some would argue, is that approach really not that helpful 
if you're trying to influence actual policy-making?
Greg: Well, I think some sort of understanding of how the 
market works in the first instance would have to precede 
any blueprints.
People often depict economic rationalism as being a kind 
of reincarnation of Adam Smith. Now obviously in one 
sense it's not, for the very obvious reason that it's not a 
matter of simply endorsing some underlying lai ssez f aire 
structure of the economy, which functions like a free- 
market economy in the 19th century. Obviously when 
people talk about a free-market economy these days, 
they're talking about trying to create something which 
doesn't exist—something which has to be nurtured, 
structures created and so on. How different is that from 
the commonsense notion of market economics that 
people derive from their understanding of Adam Smith?
Ivo: I think it's more basic than even their understanding 
of Adam Smith. There's a dichotomy between what I'd call 
micro- and macro-rationalism. The concept of competition 
is very logical, very appealing to an average person. If 
there's competition between two service stationsidown the 
road, you know the price of petrol is going to be cheaper. 
And that sort of grass-roots level of identification with the 
benefits of competition has grown into what Peter calls 
market fetishism, the belief that markets work in every 
single case. And it's a hard case to argue against, because 
of that simple logic to the average person that competition 
is a good thing.
I suppose the point I was getting at was, how many 
competitive markets can one point to in the real world?
Greg: Without wanting to get theoretical, perhaps Ivo's 
example of the petrol station tends to focus the mind on 
where the issues might lie. We speak about competition 
and efficiency, and the social benefits from those two 
things, but it's always focussing on the consumption of 
these final commodities like petrol or supermarket goods, 
And neither the theoretical answers, nor the popular im­
agination, goes to the heart of things.
Peter: But even in the sphere of consumption, there isn't 
any competition. A lot of policy has been aimed at creating 
so-called level playing-fields, but what level playing-fields 
do is favour the big players. Financial deregulation is 
exactly a case in point. The idea of financial deregulation 
was that it was going to improve everyone's access to 
financial markets, and what happened? It was the big 
players, the Alan Bonds and Kerry Packers, who gained, 
and the small players, individuals and small businesses 
were denied access to those markets.
Ivo: In the banking industry there's a more fundamental 
problem of the market in that there are barriers to entry in 
the retail sector of the banking market. Competition was 
relatively effective in reducing margins and so on in the 
corporate banking sector, but at the retail level there was 
just no competition.
Sue: I wanted to go back to the question of how far or­
thodox economics is really guiding things. My intelligence
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tells me that Michael Porter's The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations is the book that's in every bureaucrat's in-tray. I 
would not describe Porter as an economic rationalist, if you 
define rationalism as market fetishism, and certainly it's 
not simply a re-hashing of outmoded ideas. And without 
eulogising the book, I think that in it there are new ideas 
about industrial clusters and new forms of industrial col­
laboration, drawn from overseas experience. So, I'm not 
convinced that the only thing driving policy in Canberra 
is some sort of neoclassical textbook model of the 
economy—although I'm sure there are many people there 
who are recruited on the basis that that kind of analysis is 
all they can do.
Greg: What's interesting about M chael Porter's book is 
that Porter, even though he doesn't define competition, is 
I think using it in the same way as Adam Smith and the 
classical economists, as part of a story about growth and 
accumulation. In neoclassical or conventional economics, 
competition is simply about the price mechanism—it's 
quite static, if you like. I think that makes Porter's a more 
sympathetic story.
Sue: And I think it's true that to a certain degree that static 
view of, for example, comparative advantage, based on the 
textbook view of things, has been to a large extent super­
seded? The old Industry Commission abstract orthodoxy, 
it seems to me, has moved a bit into the background. And 
ideas like Porter's, which focus more on innovation and 
knowhow, are now actually driving policy to some extent.
If we're reasonably clear about what we think economic 
rationalism is, and what its shortcomings are at the level 
of a body of ideas, why is it that it has become so powerful 
and persuasive—and why now, over the last decade or 
so? Michael Pusey's book focuses on the bureaucracy, its 
cadres, if you like, where they've come from and how—  
and obviously there are some people who would find 
that perspective persuasive. But there are other ways of 
looking at the question as well. It's not just a matter of 
how the bureaucrats were taught, it's al so a matter o f why 
that seemed to them useful in what they thought was the 
context of the time. And then also, why it spread out, far 
wider than the bureaucracy, to become 'commonsense' in 
public life as well.
Ivo: There's one simple factor here which I think is under­
estimated. The ability of the rationalists to 'produce a 
number', to generate sets of figures, via the rise of 
econometrics, has helped their ability to win the case, and 
to influence the debate. It has done so because it provide a 
simple focus on the benefits of a particular political point 
of view, whereas the opposite point of view may seem a bit 
abstract.
Peter: My objection to that is that every time they produce 
a prediction they're wrong. And not only are they wrong, 
but by a matter of orders of magnitude.
Ivo: But that doesn't get into the mainstream of the policy 
debate in my opinion, and it doesn't really matter, because, 
having a number, even if that number is wrong, is better
than having no number at all. From the point of view of 
someone who's trying to write an article for a newspaper 
and explain something very simply, someone who's not a 
specialist in economics, numbers matter. Just look at the 
newspapers. Every number that the Industry Commission 
puts out gets front-page coverage.
Sue: There are other models, too, some of which can 
generate just as many predictions as the Treasury's model 
can. The question is, why are the assumptions in the 
Treasury's model taken for granted? It's been very widely 
criticised, yet somehow it seems impossible to demolish it 
as a tool.
Greg: I want to come back to the question about economic 
rationalism arising in a period of turmoil, that period being 
the 80s. My thinking is that it was not a period of such 
turmoil; it was a period of growth—and, if we take 1983 as 
a base, it has until recently been a period of pretty much 
sustained growth. I don't have an answer to your question, 
but it seems to me that only compounds the irony that the 
sort of economic populism associated with economic 
rationalism should be arising in this period. Maybe we 
really need to look back to the late 70s, to the disaffection 
with traditional policies which emerged then.
Maybe then we also need to sketch in the wider political 
and economic context of the 70s — the anxieties of 
Keynesianism, the rise in commonsense of the idea of a 
crisis of the welfare state, and therefore a certain loss of 
confidence or direction.
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Sue: And then you also need to look at the international 
economy: the collapse of the old world financial system 
symbolised by Bretton Woods, and the subsequent inter­
nationalisation of the financial area. Surely that's part of 
the objective context in which those policies grew up.
P e te r  And that's vital for a small country like Australia, 
because it really limits what we can do. Before the collapse 
of Bretton Woods there was a certain degree to which we 
could insulate ourselves from world events, but that's very 
much less the case now. A Cambridge economist called 
Frank Wilkinson has talked about how bad monetary 
policy in one country will crowd out good monetary policy 
in other countries. Why? Because a tight monetary policy 
will push up interest rates in any economy. If other 
countries don't change their policy, that will lead to huge 
capital inflows into the country practising the bad 
monetary policy. Their balance of payments will start look­
ing good, they'll get a lot of money to revitalise industry 
and so on, so that other countries have to imitate bad 
monetary policy as a response. That was what started 
happening in the 80s. Countries were using their rate of 
interest as a way of defending their balance of payments, 
and, because tight monetary policy is associated with tight 
fiscal policy, that allowed economic rationalism much 
greater leverage in the debate.
What strikes me whenever there's a Left discussion about 
the triumph of economic rationalism, is that we tend to 
talk about it as if we're trying to explain why people 
collectively start behaving in a quasi-hysterical fashion. 
It's like some of the liberal explanations of why Germany 
went Nazi—explanations which claim that the Germans 
have a peculiar kind of national angst, or that it's all the 
fault of 19th century romanticism. In other words, we try 
to explain economic rationalism as if it's, ironically, ir­
rationalism, which people have adopted for reasons that 
are therefore not rationally explicable. But are there per­
haps rational reasons why policy-makers might have 
adopted the tenets of economic rationalism when they 
did, and what is it about economic rationalism that seems 
to make economic problems look more easily explicable 
to policy-makers?
Peten To look at why economic rationalism has succeeded, 
you've got to look at who are the main beneficiaries. And 
again, it's the large corporations and powerful individuals. 
They have a very strong vested interest in economic 
rationalism. And those are the people who, to a very large 
extent, control the means by which information is dissemi­
nated. And that must have some effect.
But the same people seemed to tolerate very different 
economic views for a considerable period of time—  
decades, in fact.
Sue: And also there are surely different sections of capital, 
if you want to call it capital. Many capitalists are doing very 
badly at the moment, and are beginning to become more 
critical of economic rationalism.
P eter And isn't that exactly what we're finding in the press 
and elsewhere? Doesn't that partly explain why the Pusey 
book is popular? People are starting to get hurt.
Greg: I'd like to come back to something I queried earlier, 
which is why there hasn't been more resistance, not just in 
the battle of ideas, but in a political way. And I'd suggest 
that one of the successful areas for economic rationalism, 
as with Thatcherism, was its capacity to break down that 
political resistance. In Thatcher's case it was a matter of 
crushing union power early on, but in the Australian con­
text I suspect the key factors were structural change and 
the secular shrinking of the union movement.
Sue: As I said before, the unions have been seeking a new 
kind of economic approach, because the old approach 
didn't work. And in doing that they've adopted some of 
the p o lic ies w hich are often  labelled  econom ic 
rationalism—policies which are popularly perceived as in 
that catalogue, but which may nevertheless not involve 
market fetishism. I don't think that improving the efficien­
cy of the ports is necessarily market fetishism. I don't think 
reducing some types of protection is markef fetishism. 
Certainly there's a big divide between the union vision of 
what should be happening, and what the government's 
actually doing. But the government hasdone some of what 
the unions have suggested—which is why I have a prob­
lem with the assertion by some that the whole of the last 
eight years, if not 12 years, has been completely consumed 
by economic rationalism. There have been some initiatives 
which have been about setting something up alternative to 
markets, such as sectoral plans. There are other initiatives 
such as the states' Industrial Supplies Offices, which are 
definitely industry policy initiatives and are about making 
markets work better. So I don't think we can define the 
whole period of the 1980s as being one which has been 
totally dominated by market fetishism.
Peter. Sue's made a very important point, and that is that 
there were various entrenched inefficiencies in the 
economy prior to the 80s. Some of those may have been 
things that originally were efficient, and circumstances 
changed. Protection was seen as pork-barrelling. There 
were a whole lot of aspects of policy which were seen as 
being inefficient, of being a drag on the Australian 
economy. And the rationalists clearly scored some early 
victories by pointing that out.
Sue: One other reason why economic rationalism has been 
so powerful is that rationalists could point to failures of 
intervention. There are obvious ones which we don't even 
need to catalogue in the Australian context. There's a ten­
dency in the labour movement Left to invoke interven­
tionist industry policy as some kind of saviour. But there 
are very important debates waiting in the wings about how 
to intervene, and who should make the decisions. Should 
it be politicians or bureaucrats, or should it be workers in 
the workplace who decide whether the company's fit for 
assistance? Should assistance be directed towards picking 
winners in the quest for big bang for the buck, or should 
we be trying rather to improve infrastructure to make the 
markets work better-like enterprise networking? Those 
things just aren't being debated. And that's one of the
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problems of casting it in such black-and-white terms; it's 
hard to get into those serious issues.
We've talked a lot about where we are today. But it seems 
to me that a lot of the critics of rationalism, and particular­
ly Michael Pusey, have very little to say about how to 
move from where we are to where we would prefer to be. 
Given that it's not much use walking up and down the 
street carrying a banner saying 'Death to economic 
rationalism! We want an alternative now', how do you in 
the environment we're in mount the arguments for a more 
interventionist policy?
Sue: Well, there's a view which says the arguments have 
already been put, and that better arguments aren't going to 
win the day in the political sphere. There's a strong argu­
ment now that in the current situation of high unemploy­
ment there could be some changes but they'll be the result 
more from political pressure. And that if there was going 
to be a change due to the acceptance of superior intellectual 
argument, then that would have happened some time back.
Let me couch the question a little differently then, so it 
Isn't so easily dismissed. What I was getting at is not so 
much the idea that if you argue cleverly enough your 
opponents will sudden slap their foreheads and say 'My 
God! You're right and I was wrong'. But rather how do 
you mount a case in specific instances for particular 
methods and mechanisms of intervention—such as, in 
Greg's example, sectoral policies?
Ivo: One way of arguing for intervention is to focus on the 
issue of transition costs. If you want to create structural 
change, you have to realise that moving from one point to 
another is not just instantaneous—which often seems to be 
the assumption. In fact, there are significant human and 
other costs involved. So then you can argue for sectoral 
policies as a means of ameliorating those costs. That's what 
the steel and TCF plans were.
Peter There's a problem, though, in sectoral policy which 
means that I doubt whether any government will introduce 
it And that is that the sort of policy that would actually do 
something activist about our economic situation is the sort 
of policy that would take a long time to show benefits. The 
payback might not come for a decade.
Ivo: But that's what the rationalists say, too. They say; 'if 
our policies don't seem to be working, it's because we 
haven't got there get. Just keep on deregulating.'
Peter. But you can see something immediately as a result 
of deregulation; you can see deregulated markets. With the 
more interventionist approach, the problem is that it takes 
years and years to build up an industry, but governments 
are elected every three. Three years isn't long enough to 
fully implement a sectoral policy, let alone see the benefits.
Ivo: We need to look at the Japanese combined approach 
we talked about earlier. We have to accept that free market
forces do work in some cases, and then find ways to com­
bine that with intervention.
Peter. What it also requires is getting a consensus. If a 
government comes in tomorrow with a policy that's 
'correct', they would still have problems implementing it. 
But it's more than that. You've got to have a policy consen­
sus which you can build up from the grassroots—so if the 
government gets dumped and a new government gets in, 
the new government is still going to find the consensus 
hard to shift.
The nam e that com es to m ind in  this regard  is Paul
“The concept of 
competition is very logical, 
very appealing to an 
average person. ”
Keating. Whatever one thinks of his policy stance in the 
80s, he pursued precisely that political approach. He took 
a set of ideas about Australia's economic problems which 
were not commons ense up to that point. He hawked them 
around the country with simple but nevertheless 
plausible slogans which could be disseminated widely in 
the media. He said we wouldn't get the payback for the 
'hard decisions' right away. And he was remarkably suc­
cessful in that, wasn't he?
Peter. But look at what he's saying now. He's attacking 
those very policies. It's very easy, in other words, to point 
to a long-term scenario of whatever sort and say the costs 
are too great.
Greg: On the subject of consensus, and how to aTgue the 
case to try to secure that consensus. I'd argue the first thing 
you have to do is set out what the objective conditions are. 
There's been a lot of headway made in that direction in the 
last five or six years. The nature of the external constraint 
is much more widely understood, both in the electorate at 
large and in the labour movement, than it was five or six 
years ago.
It's interesting that the last tim e such a braod policy  
consensus w as obtained was after W orld W ar Two, in a 
clim ate of national em ergency and w ith  the popular fer­
m ent provided by the war.
Greg: And it wouldn't be impossible for such a broadly- 
based support for a set of policies to arise again, in the next 
five years. But I suspect that if it does, it will be by virtue 
of an unholy alliance of the NSW Labor Right and the 
Victorian Labor Left...
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